INTRODUCTION
T HE accession to the European Union (EU) of Central Europe's postcommunist states has been regarded as a success story. Within a short period of time the prospect of EU membership, among other factors, has induced these countries to institutionalize democratic practices. The Rose and Orange revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine have inspired hopes that these states will one day also join the prestigious club of Western nations.
One apparent pattern in these developments is the advancement of democratization from the West eastward.
1 Yet, if this is the case, what explains the puzzling stubborn refusal of some postcommunist states to embrace democracy? Belarus has unshakably remained Europe's last dictatorship; in Moldova, democracy has been on the decline; and recently, Freedom House has downgraded Russia to "not free" status.
2 Among Western donors disillusionment abounds. They
World Politics 58 ( July 2006), now stress the limits more than the power of external-norm entrepreneurship efforts. 3 Certain nations, scholars argue, are simply too "impervious to outside influences." 4 They feel "surrounded by foes" and nurture an unwavering "hostility towards the West." 5 Are some postcommunist states all that impervious or is something missing in the analysis that prevents researchers from accurately observing and predicting change?
We argue that a "center-centered" 6 perspective obscures the understanding of what we call geographic incremental processes of democratization at subnational levels. Even when national politicians exhibit authoritarian tendencies, territorially conditioned diffusion processes from the West and targeted democratization efforts of Western neighbors help build up support for democracy among local actors. 7 We advance this argument by conducting process-tracing case studies of Western involvement in Russia's regions and statistical analysis of openness and democracy levels as they relate to geographic location and Western aid. Our case studies are based on field research conducted over a two-year period in several subnational regions as well as on indepth interviews with regional actors and EU officials in Moscow and Brussels. For our statistical analysis we constructed an original data set of all EU projects (more than one thousand) conducted in Russia's regions over fourteen years.
In the first section, we discuss approaches to external influences on democracy and propose an alternative theory. We then outline a framework for investigating Western impact on Russia's regions. Next, we examine patterns of EU aid allocation. The fourth part presents statistical analysis of the relationships between proximity to the West, EU aid, and regional outcomes. In the fifth part, we deepen the exploration of the relevant causal mechanisms by conducting process-tracing case studies of two northwestern regions, Karelia and Pskov. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of broader implications for theory building and for understanding patterns of democratization.
Much of the theorizing on democratization shares two important shortcomings with the original transitology framework, however. The first is the absence of territorially conditioned external factors as key variables, and the second is the essentially deterritorialized, whole nation-biased 12 view of democratic change. Regarding the prior, Whitehead proposed a typology that only hints at the significance of territory. One element in his typology of external influences is "contagion through proximity," which explains the temporal sequencing of clusters of democratization in particular geographic locations. 13 Schmitter adds another dimension to Whitehead's typology, conditionality, which has been a motor for democratic consolidation in those postcommunist EU accession states that are regionally clustered and adjacent to West European democracies.
14 Despite references to geography in such elements of the typology as contagion and conditionality, geography is not explicitly theorized and statements about its relevance are highly qualified. Whitehead does not specify how contagion operates, indicating that it is a subject for future research. "We are searching . . . for neutral transmission mechanisms that might induce countries bordering on democracies to replicate the political institutions of their neighbors," he writes. He even downplays the role of territory in the context of the growing role of mass communications. He states that "images of the good life in North America or Western Europe may produce equally powerful effects in the Southern Cone as in the Caribbean, in Siberia as in the Baltic States." 15 Schmitter also cautions against "exaggerate [ing] either the reach of . . . communicative interdependence or its impact upon democratization."
16 "Modern systems of communication are not so spatially bound," he writes. 17 Like Whitehead, Schmitter stops short of identifying precise ways in which territorial contexts might be important for communication and diffusion. He states that "the international context is a 12 Snyder (fn. 6). 13 The other elements in his typology being "control" and "consent." Laurence Whitehead, "Three International Dimensions of Democratization," in Whitehead (fn. 9), 15.
14 Philippe C. Schmitter, "The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies," in Whitehead (fn. 9).
15 Whitehead (fn. 13), 21. 16 Schmitter (fn. 14), 35. 17 Ibid., 38.
notoriously difficult variable to pin down . . . its causal impact is often indirect, working in mysterious and unintended ways." 18 In their masterful volume on democratic transitions, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan identify the importance of transnational diffusion effects. Their concept of the international political community with its stress on the global reach of mass communications also shifts focus away from the territorial aspects of diffusion. They do admit that a "regional hegemon" such as the European Union may play a "major supportive . . . role in helping a fledgling democracy in the region," but they qualify its role as not determinative. 19 Geographically uneven patterns of democratic outcomes are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore, however. An early study by Adam Przeworski has been strongly criticized for suggesting that geography no longer matters. 20 In it he writes, "geography, with whatever it implies, is just not enough to shape economic and political futures."
21 A more recent study by Przeworski and his collaborators, however, serves as a significant corrective to that premise. They find that "the larger the proportion of democracies on the globe and in the region during a particular year, the more likely is democracy to survive in any particular country." They too highlight the methodological complications involved in "statistically distinguish [ing] different mechanisms by which the international climate becomes transmitted to particular countries." 22 Within the postcommunist region in particular, there is a growing recognition of geographical clustering of democratic winners and losers. 23 The peculiarity of these constellations is summarized in M. Steven Fish's comparative study of postcommunist regimes: "The West seems to prevail over the East." 24 Valerie Bunce likewise notes the importance of "geography" 25 and the "striking intraregional contrast in postsocialist economic and political pathways," with Central and East European countries in the west better performers than the former USSR states in the east. 26 While largely focusing on domestic factors in accounting for postcommunist regime variations, Michael McFaul concedes that "neighborhoods" and proximity to the West "matter." 27 Nevertheless, scholars have yet to take the next step in establishing precisely how regional contexts matter, empirically and theoretically, and literature on the topic remains scarce. For example, with respect to geography, both Bunce and McFaul in their recent articles include reference to one single study by Jeffrey Kopstein and David Reilly that we later discuss in detail. 28 This fact illustrates not the omission of important sources on the part of Bunce and McFaul, but the paucity of literature on the subject.
Fish identifies a major factor complicating analysis of the impact of geographical contexts. He argues that although "geographical location may well affect the cross-national variation in trajectories of democratization,"
29 the "empirical foundations of such prima facie conclusions" remain "shaky."
30 Pointing to the overlap of geography with factors such as history, religion, and imperial tutelage, he argues in a footnote: "It is impossible to separate out the possible weight of these factors."
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But what if levels of democracy are territorially uneven within the same national context, where variations in patterns of historical incorporation and imperial tutelage are not as substantial as between countries formerly part of distinct empires? In such cases it would be possible not only to separate the impact of geography from other factors but also to account for external diffusion influences on democratization in a way that would not be feasible when looking at the nation as a whole.
This brings us to the second shortcoming in the literature on democratization: the bias toward a whole-nation view of democratic change. The underestimation of the territorial aspects of democratic change has been evident not only in how scholars look at external influences but also in the lack of emphasis on the role of subnational actors. 32 To the extent that subnational territory has been included in the construction of the relevant theoretical frameworks, it has often been discussed with reference to the widely cited dictum of Dunkwart Rustow about prerequisites for democratization. Key among these is the general agreement on the boundaries of the state and nation. 33 In postcommunist contexts, testimony to the influence of this premise is that the most extensively theorized territorial aspect of democratization has been the contestation of nation and state boundaries by minority ethnic groups. 34 An emphasis on ethnicity, however, shifts the focus away from other territory-specific factors, such as variations in subnational democracy in ethnically homogenous settings. At the same time, the modernist stress on national boundedness obscures the importance of territorial diffusion of external influences, which are dynamic and may serve to unbound national and local identities.
Within-nation regional variations in democracy and territorially uneven external influences on it have remained marginal to the debate 32 on democratization. Such whole-nation bias is not unique to studies of postcommunism. It has arguably dominated much of the recent research on political and economic liberalization in various contexts. Richard Snyder has rightly cautioned that "mean-spirited" analysis whereby national-level statistical means are used in cross-country comparative studies may distort research results. 35 In Mexico, for example, a national perspective on neoliberal reform would obscure the "diverse array of new institutions" at the subnational level. 36 In this and other Latin American states, Jonathan Fox finds "enclaves of authoritarianism" in otherwise democratizing national contexts, whereas Guillermo O'Donnell urges us to distinguish between within-nation territorial "shades" of democracy. 37 In India Patrick Heller finds variable "quality of democracy" at the subnational level. Generalizing to other countries, he argues that democracy can be built "from the bottom-up" even in contexts where national-level conditions may not be favorable to democratization. 38 Most famously, Robert Putnam persuasively argues how local contexts determine whether democracy works or not. 39 Russia, the world's biggest country, is a good laboratory for exploring subnational democratic change. Scholars now point to substantial disparities in levels of regional democracy-from variations in political party development, to variable local government strength and independence, to different levels of maturity of civil society and social capital. 40 41 researchers have yet to establish causal relationships between exposure to the West and local political outcomes.
Our geographic incrementalist theory makes a specific link between external and subnational variables in highlighting their combined impact on democracy in the polity as a whole through processes of territorial diffusion and targeted aid. 42 The theory presupposes the existence of a powerful regional player, which could be one country or a union of states adhering to core democratic values. Inevitably, there will be greater intensity of movement of people, goods, information, ideas, and technologies between this player and neighboring subnational regions than between this player and localities that are more remote. 43 The spontaneity of these processes, which may have both negative and positive effects for adjacent areas, forces the external actor to pursue regionally targeted policies aimed at facilitating or curbing exchanges with a neighboring unit or at improving governance there in an effort to reduce the negative spillover effects from problematic neighbors. A combination of spontaneous diffusion processes and targeted efforts contributes to the development of geographically uneven patterns of change in a given country.
As the key Western player on the Eurasian landmass, the EU provides ample material for testing the theory. The EU project is premised upon the importance for democracy of both spontaneous interactions of broader publics that serve to affirm a core set of democratic values, theorized by Karl Deutsch, and targeted conditionality carrot-and-stick policies aimed at national governments. 44 countries that have already acceded to the EU testify to its impact on national government policies and legal and institutional frameworks. 45 The possible impact of the EU on the domestic developments of noncandidate countries, even at a national level has not been studied in any extensive fashion, however. Similarly, the EU's effects on subnational democracy levels in these states have also been neglected. In the following sections we seek to correct these important omissions by testing our theory in Russian regional settings.
STOCKS AND FLOWS AND MEASURES OF DEMOCRACY
In constructing an analytical framework for testing our theory, we draw on the Kopstein and Reilly article on geographic diffusion, which is undoubtedly one of the most interesting statements on the importance of geography and its impacts on postcommunist democratic reform. 46 Given the differences in the availability of regional as opposed to national statistics in Russia as well as in our line of argumentation, our analysis does not replicate that of Kopstein and Reilly. Another difference from their work is that we examine regional performance in relation to geographical proximity to just one set of external actorsWest European democracies. In addition, we refine their method by constructing an original data set of EU projects conducted in Russia's regions as a measure of subnational-level targeted aid. This is meant to supplement the spontaneous diffusion measures and extend the analysis beyond the national level.
Kopstein and Reilly sought to explain the divergent reform outcomes of postcommunist states on the basis of geographic location. They found strong correlation between political performance and distance from the West.
Drawing insight from diffusion theories, they also distinguish between "stocks" and "flows," with stocks representing "the assets, liabilities, or general qualities of a given unit . . . [that] may be physical, political, economic, or cultural," while "flows represent the movement of information and resources between countries." Even if a country is favorably endowed with a certain spatial stock, such as a geographic location close to a Western democracy, its degree of openness to external flows might be affected by "choice"-the decisions that states and individuals make 45 46 Kopstein and Reilly (fn. 1). Kopstein and Reilly also include a reference to "circumstance," which in addition to "choice" has an impact on flows. with regard to opening or closing themselves to the outside world and the willingness of external actors to influence those decisions. Examples of favorable choices include the EU leaders' decision to invite a given country to join the Union and the willingness of a candidate country to open itself to EU influences when faced with such prospects. The processes of diffusion (flows), therefore, are not unidirectional. They are interactive in nature and are affected not only by stocks but also by conscious choices of individuals at both external and domestic levels. 47 In order to measure flows, Kopstein and Reilly construct an openness criterion that examines domestic-actor receptivity to external influences. The World Development Indicators (WDI) they use are number of televisions, newspaper circulation, outgoing international telecommunications, international inbound tourism, foreign direct investment, and international trade. They find that openness is positively correlated with political and economic reform.
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Kopstein and Reilly also construct a more complex measure of stocks. They suggest that "friends and neighbors" influence states in ways that make them more similar to one another in terms of behavioral patterns. 49 States, they find, form clusters of entities with similar levels of political and economic freedoms; promoters of democracy are located in the West and those with a tendency toward autocracy are in Central Asia.
Russia, curiously, in their analysis, emerges as not belonging to any cluster. They explain away this fact by suggesting that similar to other "remnant cores of formerly imperial powers," Russia is "especially impervious to outside influences."
50
Fascinating as Kopstein and Reilly's arguments are with regard to spatial influences on domestic outcomes, they contain a puzzling contradiction-one that is in line with the whole-nation bias of the literature on democratization. While the two scholars take as a starting point that location matters, they regard a country that spans eleven time zones and is the world's largest in terms of the size of its landmass as one single unit of analysis. In other words, it does not appear to make a difference for their study whether looking at the northern metropolis of St. Petersburg, at Siberia's city of Chilym, or at the far eastern town of Anadyr.
Clearly, if geography matters, it is important to factor in the variable and spatially uneven friends-and-neighbors democratizing effects on subnational areas into the analysis of stocks and flows.
As with Kopstein and Reilly, we hypothesize that proximity to West European democracies has a positive impact on the regions located closest to them and that this effect could be assessed by looking at trends in changes in openness and democracy over time. Our measure of distance (location stock), is the number of kilometers between the regional capital in each of Russia's eighty-nine regions and Helsinkithe closest capital of an established European democracy.
In order to calculate flows (the measure of openness), we created aggregate scores consisting of a range of subindicators related to trade, foreign investment, newspaper readership, and telecommunications. 51 The measures are similar to those of Kopstein and Reilly and also share the same validity limitations. Most of the subindicators are classical measures of modernization and socioeconomic development, and there is a high correlation between them and urbanization. The approach is therefore vulnerable to criticism that it would be hard to disentangle the effects of flows from standard modernization explanations of democratization. We explicitly acknowledge this limitation and address it in our analysis by controlling for other modernization aspects, such as urbanization, and by establishing that our results, though sensitive to model specification, still hold. We prefer the concept of flows to that of modernization because we link it analytically to stocks, that is, location, thereby also disentangling external effects from domestic factors. We hypothesize that stocks, that is, proximity to West European democracies, determine the speed and nature of flows. As such, we add an external and geographically focused dimension to our understandings of democratization that is absent in classical modernization approaches.
The most complete data for the widest range of the relevant subindicators were available only for the years 1999-2002. This complicated an assessment of longer-term time trends. We therefore constructed additional openness scores (oscores) composed of a smaller range of subindicators that covered earlier years. We then conducted a reliability test that turned out to be highly significant for all the scores. This allowed us to rely on the score with wider year coverage as a proxy for the more inclusive openness score in conducting data analysis. The more inclusive openness scores were also used in other tests that did not require wider year coverage. Detailed procedures for calculating the scores, as well as the results of the reliability test, are contained in Appendixes 1 and 2. 51 Data on international tourism for the regions were not available from Goskomstat.
We take the data on regional political democratization from the expert evaluation indexes that Nikolay Petrov and his collaborators compiled using the Freedom House method. 52 These scholars composed one aggregate democracy score for 1991-2001. The score was calculated by asking a panel of experts to examine developments in the regions for all these years and assign scores on a five-point scale to each of the ten spheres that were deemed important for assessing the overall democracy climate in the regions. For example, judicial independence was assessed by looking at court cases covering all these years. The ten scores were then added together to form the overall democracy score; the lowest possible score was ten and the highest was fifty. They used this technique to register temporal changes in a more systematic way starting from 1999 and created moving-average scores for 1999-2003 and 2000-2004 . The experts would make annual adjustments to each of the ten subindicators based on shifts in the respective spheres. They chose to use a moving-average method rather than year-by-year indicators because a major change in one year, such as gubernatorial election and turnover in one region, could substantially affect the overall score and would present an inaccurate picture unless subsequent gubernatorial elections in later years in other regions are factored in. This technique, also called the "exponentially mapped past average," is most commonly used to reduce stochastic noise effects, which might otherwise complicate the uncovering of underlying trends. 53 The average is adjusted to eliminate cyclical variations, which reduces random fluctuations. Appendix 6 presents a detailed description of the democracy index.
54 Figure 1 is a visual presentation of democracy levels and variations based on Petrov's scores.
We begin the analysis of these variations by establishing basic correlation patterns between the distance, openness, and democracy vari- . 54 The scores for democratization or democracy as applied to regional contexts were used in relative terms. Petrov's method does not imply that regions at the top of the ranking are necessarily democracies, but that relative to other regions they have higher levels of political pluralism, electoral competitiveness, media freedom, economic liberalization, civil society, judicial independence, elite turnover, and so forth. There is also a correspondence between a favorable location stock and levels of regional openness, with the more distant location negatively associated with levels of openness. The more western regions are likewise better democratic performers. These results are presented in Table 1 and, while they tell little about the actual direction of causality and the significance of other factors that might be at work, they are a first step in creating a model for assessing the impact of external factors on democracy.
GEOGRAPHY, AID, AND DEMOCRACY
Since diffusion is just one dimension of Western influences and flows may not automatically translate into greater democracy, our next step is to factor into the analysis the impact of Western aid. Political reform is 55 I.e., allowing a one-year lag. For summary statistics, see Appendix 3. The bivariate correlation matrix with all variables used in the analysis in the paper is in Appendix 5. As is well known, Russia's prospects for EU membership have always been dim and President Putin's "managed democracy" 57 has done little to improve them. 58 Nevertheless, over the last fifteen years, the EU has provided substantial aid to Russia 59 -over 2.6 billion euros within the framework of the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States program (TACIS)-aimed at "promot[ing] the transition to a market economy and . . . reinforc[ing] democracy and the rule of law."
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Pursuit of these objectives is consistent with the EU's external relations priorities as a "normative power." 61 Of course, the security of the Union itself is an important objective in EU external aid policies and is linked with democracy promotion, the assumption being that peace and economic prosperity of the Union are enhanced when its neighbors share with it fundamental democratic values.
How does the EU select the agencies that it funds as part of this agenda among a plurality of recipient regions? Two key criteria can be identified from an examination of EU funding documents. The first could be summarized as geography matters. In what the EU refers to as the proximity agenda, it tends to allocate large volumes of aid to neighboring developing and postcommunist countries. In the Russian context, aid to subnational regions located in geographical proximity to the EU has become an increasingly important aspect of this wider objective. This proximity agenda has been influenced in turn by Russia's closest neighbors in the EU.
Policymakers in Brussels would be hard-pressed to admit that Russia's western regions are now in Europe's focus and prefer to speak of their partnership with the country as a whole. Nevertheless, what started off in the early 1990s as a program to assist the whole of Russia as well as CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) states with weak or no prospects for EU membership, has increasingly acquired a western and northern regionally focused dimension. The Nordic states, Finland in particular but also Sweden and Denmark, have been influential in this politics of bon voisinage. 62 The cold-war era marginal status of these countries as Europe's Nordic periphery has given way to their increasing assertiveness in setting Europe's agenda vis-à-vis her eastern neighbors. A liberal focus on soft rather than hard security issues, characteristic of their involvement in world affairs in general, has become the trademark feature in their relations with Russia. Postmodern jargon such as the "de-bordering"of borders and the "de-othering" of others now peppers the discourse of Nordic politicians shaping policy vis-à-vis Russia. 63 The concept of border is seen as the product of dated realpolitik conceptions of the world and greater emphasis is now placed on the fuzzier concepts of "boundary" and "frontier." These new conceptions became more salient after the latest round of accession of states to the EU. With the membership of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Europe also acquired a Russian exclave, Kaliningrad, and miles of shared borders with other northwestern regions. The recognition that "the wild East begins just across the border" did not lead Europe to wall itself off against the problem neighbor. 65 Addressing issues of concern to it requires support for democratic institutions such as free media, civil society organizations, an independent judiciary, and transparent and responsive local and regional governments on the other side of the border. Environmental pollution does not recognize political boundaries or security checkpoints, neither does crime or HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis. The EU's most recent European Neighborhood Policy, which is slated to replace TACIS with a new set of funding programs in the coming years, has further reinforced the regional and frontier dimension of EU aid. 66 The second important EU criterion could be labeled "rewarding good achievers." "Commitment to reform is critical to TACIS performance and should be rewarded," one recent EU document stated, for example, and urged "greater selectivity of assistance, [and] focusing on areas with proven reform commitment." 67 If these criteria do apply to subnational territories, then they might turn out to be conflicting in practice. What if a region with proven reform commitment is not exactly located in the EU's neighborhood, while one lacking such commitment is right on the EU's border? An examination of EU aid allocation to Russia's regions helps address these questions.
A mere glance at the map of TACIS local support offices (LSOs) hints at the territorially uneven patterns of aid flows (Figure 2 ). Of the nine LSOs, four are located in Russia's northwest and none of the others are much further out than western Siberia. If the location of these bureaus is any indication of the EU's view of Europe, it is one that stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals-and not all the way to Vladivostok. 68 Figure 3 shows that aid recipients are largely clustered in Russia's northwest and, to a lesser extent, in the Central, Volga-Urals, and West Siberian regions. Only a tiny number of projects were conducted in the Southern Federal District, and aid to the Far East was virtually nonexistent. There is a strong geographical Western dimension to EU aid, with aid thinning out toward the south and east. Interestingly, some of the more remote regions have been beneficiaries of substantial volumes of aid. Table 2 indicates that if a region is located in the northwest, it is likely to obtain a large volume of funding even if it does not have the highest democracy scores. By contrast, the non-Northwest Federal District regions that have been recipients of large volumes of aid are usually high democratic achievers relative to other regions.
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The geography-matters criterion becomes less important when the EU wants to reward good achievers in the more remote regions. Neverthe- less, project activity in the more remote regions does not extend much beyond western Siberia. At the same time, "rewarding good achievers" is not uniformly applied in locations where "geography matters."
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Simple bivariate exercises presented in Table 3 using the total aid volumes in both gross and per capita terms for all the years, suggest that the further a region is from the West, the less likelihood there is of it obtaining EU aid. This relationship is not very strong, however. Moreover, if aid is divided into smaller three-year subperiods, one can see differences over time in the significance of the relationship between distance and aid. This discrepancy is probably due to the simple fact that three years may be too short a term for making solid inferences about time trends. Still, on balance, the results confirm that distance The results of bivariate exercises presented in Table 4 confirm that prior regional democracy levels have a strong positive association with aid levels: good achievers do get rewarded.
Project records also indicate that the republics with large Muslim populations in the Volga-Urals and southern areas of Russia cooperated in very few projects, with the North Caucasus republics in particular standing out for the virtual absence of TACIS regional aid. An important factor militating against simplistic culturalist explanations of these aid choices is that republics with large or predominantly Muslim populations also have some of the lowest intraregional democracy ratings.
72 In Petrov's democracy indexes for 1991-2001, all but two of such entities rank among the bottom twenty regions. If democracy is the driver behind the EU's involvement in a geographically remote region, then it might explain these aid patterns.
Given the geographically uneven nature of aid and diffusion processes from the West and the plurality of domestic factors that could be affecting regional democracy, how do we begin to uncover the mechanisms that might be at work? 73 The number of groups after excluding the above regions is seventy-nine. Therefore, the panel data has 158 observations. The independent variables in the panel seek to capture the key domestic factors affecting democratization, such as urbanization and religion, and the key external factors, such as aid per capita and distance, as well as openness, which is conceptually linked to all of these factors. These variables include two time-invariant variables and three timevariant ones. We experimented with different time lags-lagging the time-variant variables by two, three, and four years, with values going back to 1997, 1996, and 1995, respectively. The first time-invariant regressor is a dummy variable for Muslim republics, which takes a value of 1 if a region's titular group (that is, Tatars in Tatarstan, Bashkirs in Bashkortostan, and so on) is predominantly Muslim and 0 otherwise. Distance from the West is the second time-invariant variable. The three time-variant variables are urbanization-which is among the key domestic factors that scholars have put forward to explain regional democracy levels-openness, and EU aid. The time-variant variables were lagged to avoid problems of endogeneity as they are used to explain democracy outcomes in 1999 and 2000. In particular, the lags were constructed on the assumption that each variable takes time to have an effect on democratic outcomes. For instance, the cumulative effect of aid on democracy takes time-at least two years-so that aid allocated in 1997, calculated as explained below, affects democracy in 1999, and aid allocated in 1998 affects democracy in 2000, with the same pattern holding for the other time-variant variables. Similar logic applies to the three-and four-year lags.
The impact of aid was calculated by constructing four-year moving averages for aid per capita. Thus, the 1997 two-year lagged value is based on the 1994-97 average of per capita volume of aid, the 1996 three-year lagged value-on the 1993-96 average of per capita volume of aid, and the 1995 four-year lagged value-on the 1992-95 average of per capita volume of aid. The logic behind this calculation is that aid volumes may vary substantially from year to year. A moving average therefore provides a more accurate picture of aid trends over time. In addition, because aid has a cumulative effect, it is the average volume of aid in per capita terms allocated up until a certain year, rather than the volume of aid in one particular year, that has an impact on democracy. The 1998 two-year lagged value is in turn based on the 1995-98 average aid per capita; the 1997 three-year lagged value, on the 1994-97 average aid per capita; and the 1996 four-year lagged value, on the 1993-96 average aid per capita.
The panel structure of the data yields information from variations within a panel, in this case a region, as well as across them. In general, panel-data estimators avoid the shortcomings of traditional regression methods such as ordinary least squares (OLS) that ignore intra-or within-panel correlation. OLS treats all observations as independent and underestimates the variance of estimated group effects when repeated measures are obtained on the same unit over a number of years.
Various panel-data methods overcome such shortcomings and provide estimates of the effects of independent variables that change over time within a region as well as across regions. These include within (fixed) effects estimators, random effects estimators, and between estimators. The between estimator uses panel-averaged values and does not consider within-panel variation. Therefore, we did not consider this estimator. The within effects estimator is used when unobserved region effects may be correlated with the independent variables. Within estimation, however, does not allow the inclusion of time-invariant regressors, which are important in our model. In addition, when between-or across-region variation is important, the within estimator that produces correct estimates will be highly inefficient and, thus, not meaningful. The random effects estimator produces correct, that is, consistent, estimates that are more efficient if panel effects are uncorrelated with regressors. This condition, however, may not hold up.
As an alternative to these approaches, we employ the populationaveraged estimator known as the generalized estimating equations (GEE). This estimator controls for unobserved region-specific effects as well as within-region correlation. Unlike the random and within effects estimators, however, GEE accounts for within-panel dependence by averaging effects over all panels. Specifically, it uses panel-level correlation that is estimated by averaging information from all panels. The estimated effect resulting from GEE is interpreted as that of an average region rather than of a specific region. In addition, the average effect is not required to be uncorrelated with the regressors. 74 The estimation results using the GEE estimator are presented in Table 5. With the exception of the Muslim republic dummy, all values in the regression have been logged. The coefficients can therefore be interpreted as capturing a percentage change in democracy for one percentage change in each explanatory variable.
The results with the two-year lags show that the parameter estimates for the Muslim republic dummy, distance, openness, urbanization, and aid are statistically significantly different from zero at least at a 95 percent confidence level. The model shows that regions located at a greater distance from the West are less likely to democratize than those located in greater proximity to it. In particular, for a 1 percent increase in distance from the West, the democracy level decreases by .055 percent within a period of two years. Aid per capita and openness, by contrast, have a positive effect on democracy. For a 1 percent increase in aid, the democracy level increases by .059 percent, and for a 1 percent increase in the openness score, the level of democracy increases by .031 percent. The democracy level for Muslim regions is less by 25 percent-holding all other effects fixed-when compared with the level for non-Muslim regions. Holding the effect of religion constant, urbanization remains the strongest predictor of democracy: for a 1 percent increase in urbanization, democracy increases by .31 percent. The results are similar with the three-and four-year lags except that openness is not statistically significantly different from zero at a 74 Glenn W. Harrison, "House Money Effects in Public Good Experiments: Comment," Experimental Economics, forthcoming (April 2006), 6, fn. 7. 95 percent confidence level, which suggests that it is sensitive to different model specifications. The coefficients for aid also decrease with the three-and four-year lags. While the three-year lag parameter for aid remains statistically significant, the four-year lag parameter is not statistically significantly different from zero at a 95 percent confidence level. Based on these results, we conclude that the effect of past aid allocations that are more distant in time is not as strong as the effect of more recent allocations.
In order to test further for the robustness of the findings, we created an alternative, cumulative measure of aid lagged by two, three, and four years. For example, with the two-year lag for the cumulative aid 1997 figure, we added together per capita aid for the years 1992-97 and for Table presents results from analysis using the population-averaged estimator known as the Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE). a the cumulative aid 1998 figure we added up the per capita aid for the years 1992-98. In other words, in this measure we include all aid that had been allocated up until 1997 and 1998 rather than use a moving average of four years. Similar logic was applied to constructing the three-and four-year lags. The assumption behind this measure is that aid volumes allocated in the early years of postcommunist development might provide essential infrastructure or other resources that serve as a basis for the effectiveness of subsequent aid allocations. For example, if an NGO received a grant to purchase computer equipment in 1992, the equipment would be important for advocacy or other activities supported by aid allocated in later years.
When we substituted the aid measure discussed above, which we also logged, for the moving-average aid measure used in the previous models, we found that the results still held. Openness, though, in this set of regressions is significant at slightly under the 90 percent confidence level for the two-year lag model and is not statistically significant for the three-and four-year lag models. This confirms that the findings with respect to this variable, similar to results from the set of models presented in Table 5 , are somewhat sensitive to model specification. Table 6 shows that the coefficients in this regression are not vastly different from those in the previous one, except that the aid coefficient for the two-year lag is substantially lower: for a 1 percent increase in cumulative aid, the democracy level increases by .0008 percent. This difference in the aid coefficients suggests that aid volumes allocated in later years, as reflected in our four-year moving average figure, might be a better predictor of democracy outcomes than the cumulative aid figure going back to the earliest days of aid allocation. Most likely, this is a reflection of the limitations of the data we are working with, namely, the availability of only two time points for democracy scores. If the scores were available for the entire decade of the 1990s, better assessments could have been made about aid allocations in the early years and democracy outcomes prior to 1999. 75 Still, for the purposes of our analysis, the most important finding is that even controlling for such domestic factors as openness, urbaniza- 75 The two-year lag with moving average aid has the highest coefficient among our aid measures. This bolsters our finding that aid allocated in later years might be a better predictor of democratic outcomes than that allocated in earlier years. Likewise, later openness indicators might be better predictors of democracy than measures going back further in time, though due to data limitations stemming from only two time points for the democracy score, caution should be exercised in making inferences about the respective temporal lags. For illustrative purposes, results from an OLS regression with twoyear lags are presented in Appendix 4. tion, and religion, distance from the West and foreign aid emerge as important predictors of democracy. It is also important to note that the logic behind creating the openness score was to assess levels of domestic receptivity to external influences. The findings further justify the inclusion of external effects variables in explanations of democratization processes in a given national or subnational context. In making this assertion, we do not belittle the impact of domestic factors most often invoked in modernization approaches to democratization. Our analysis provides straightforward confirmation that the urbanization variable is the strongest predictor of regional democracy but it also confirms our premise that greater emphasis should be put on external factors when explaining regional political outcomes. The two frontier regions of Karelia and Pskov illustrate how geography has made a difference both for external aid choices and levels of democracy. Karelia, a region with high levels of initial openness, demonstrates how proximity to the West and aid can further reinforce a region's democracy level. Pskov, by contrast, shows how even regions with low levels of initial openness and democracy can be transformed by sustained Western engagement.
Karelia shares a 740 kilometer-long border with Finland and parts of Karelia belonged to Finland before World War II. 76 In the Soviet era this frontier location was a disadvantage. During the cold war, Karelia was part of a regional security cluster that was one of the most highly militarized zones in the world. In addition, it lagged behind many localities in economic factors including its level of industrial production.
Nonetheless, from the outset of the postcommunist transformation, Karelia ranked as one of Russia's more open and, relative to other regions, more democratic subnational entities. It was the second republic to declare sovereignty in 1990. Rather than proceeding to use its center-regional treaty-based authority to undermine political pluralism as did leaders in many other republics, Karelia's regional leaders chose a different path of development. Karelia became one of the few regions to boast a local party system and currently has one of Russia's most active and diverse NGO communities. The level of its media independence is also assessed to be higher than in most Russian regions. In Petrov's latest ranking of regional democracy (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , Karelia is among the top three Russian regions. 77 We argue that it is the Western leanings of both the elite leadership and the broader society combined with a commitment to the republic's political and economic reform by its neighbor, Finland, and subsequently by the EU and other European actors, that account for the peculiarity of Karelia's development trajectory. The individual credited with placing Karelia firmly on Europe's map is one of the few senior At the same time, in what was a two-way process, the European actors-Finland in particular-sponsored many reform initiatives in the republic. After Finland's accession to the EU in 1995, its involvement in Karelia intensified. At once eligible for EU funding, Finland saw its membership as an opportunity for increasing its influence on Russia's western frontier regions as well as on the EU's strategic thinking with regard to its eastern neighbor. In 2000, the EU established three Finnish border counties and Russian Karelia as the first Euroregion (Euregio Karelia) on the border between the EU and Russia. 81 This made Finland eligible for millions of euros that it could spend on cooperation projects with Karelia.
The involvement of Finland, other Nordic states, and the EU in Karelia has become so massive that it is no longer appropriate to describe Western aid as being "thinly spread" in this particular region. 82 A republic of only 716,000 people, it was a beneficiary of hundreds of aid projects from the EU; the national, regional, and municipal governments and NGOs of the Nordic states; and from Northern Europe's various intergovernmental organizations. 83 Of the externally funded programs operating in 2003, for example, thirty were financed under the auspices of Interreg, Europe's instrument for cross-border cooperation; twenty-four by the Nordic Council of Ministers; eleven by the Barents Secretariat; eight by the Swedish region of Westerbotten; and four by the Swedish Agency for International Development. In monetary terms, the aid projects ranged from a few hundred to over a half-million euros. Funding included grants for professorships in Norwegian language at Karelia State University, democracy training for the region's young politicians, and the development of song and dance ensembles for indigenous peoples.
The regional elites' strategies and openness to cooperation, or leadership factor, and the West's developmental commitments were key to Karelia's success in obtaining external funding. A third set of factors involved the openness of the broader society. During the Soviet era there were social exchanges between Karelia and Finland, and Finnish was taught at the local university. Contacts with Finland and other Nordic neighbors intensified after communism's collapse. As one local official put it, in Karelia no one escapes contact with Finland or other Nordic actors-almost every Karelian has some interaction with Western neighbors be it as a grant beneficiary, tourist, exchange student, or businessman. Several high schools now teach Finnish and Swedish and several university departments have relevant language and history courses. 85 These three factors-openness of the Karelian regional elite, the West's strong commitment to develop the frontier region, and openness of Karelian society-account for the region's record in attracting aid and the peculiarity of its institutional development.
Local government, which is used in Petrov's study as one of the subindicators in calculations of regional democracy levels, provides a specific example of how Western involvement affected Karelia's institutional development. The EU regards democratically elected and socially responsive local government as an important institutional component of a democratic polity. The significance that the EU attaches to it is embodied in a special charter and in the various municipal-development-related TACIS programs in Russia.
A comparative study by Vladimir Gel'man and his collaborators that sought to explain variations in local democracy among Russia's regions in the first postcommunist decade, identified the transboundary factor as key to explaining the development of Karelia's local government. This factor was important in Karelia's 1994 adoption of a democratic law on local government modeled on North European institutionsthe first such law among Russian regions. EU funding also became an important resource affecting municipal politics in the region. For example, in an effort to extend his power base in struggles against the regional governor, the mayor of the regional capital tapped into the many sources of EU funding. The mayor was successful in obtaining grants in competition against other municipalities and regional bodies only if he could demonstrate the democratic nature of his administration and its social and economic performance. Importantly, the federal govern- 85 Author interview with Tat'yana Klekachova, executive director, Swedish-Karelian Business and Information Center, Petrozavodsk, July 9, 2004. ment, a key domestic actor, played only a marginal role in the process. For example, when the mayor of a regional city tried to attract federal funding to strengthen his institutional power base, "the hope for help from the federal center was in vain, whereas Western sources turned out to be more effective." "Generally," write Gel'man et al., "international factors continue to play a certain role in the maintenance of the political autonomy of the city." Numerous training seminars, partnerships with Nordic municipalities, and other contacts with EU donors over a decade ensured not only that the municipalities would seek to present a positive image of themselves to score points with the donors, but also that certain norms actually became internalized in local government practices. The importation of Western norms and practices has been evident in local government-NGO partnerships, consultations with NGOs, and in public tendering of municipal services contracts.
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Most recently, within the framework of a new federal law on local selfgovernment, in 2005 a number of Karelia's localities opted for direct popular election of mayors in contrast to those in the many other regions that settled on mayoral appointment by local councils. The latter system is perceived to be less democratic and, in the Russian political context, more easy to manipulate from above.
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Pskov oblast is a Western frontier region with a population of 760,000-similar in size to Karelia. Until recently, it differed significantly from Karelia both in terms of openness of the regional elites and Western commitment to it. In the 1990s, as its neighbors Estonia and Latvia enjoyed rapid growth, democratic reform, and successful bids to EU membership, Pskov remained one of Russia's least developed areas. Politically, Pskov has been a closed regime, electing a governor with a reformist agenda only at the end of 2004. In 1998, the United States Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott likened Pskov to a "Jurassic-like theme park[s] of Soviet-era policies and personalities"-a stark contrast to what he called Russia's regional "oases of liberalization." 88 Between 1996 and 2004, Pskov suffered from the incompetent rule of Governor Vyacheslav Mikhailov, who suppressed political opposition and freedom of the press. Running on a patriotic ticket in 1996, Mikhailov became Russia's only governor affiliated with the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic party of Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Mikhailov's political affiliation and sympathies for the Russian ultranationalists did little to promote confidence building with the oblast's Baltic neighbors. Instead, the governor placed a high priority on Pskov's relations with the Belarus dictatorship. This contrasts with Karelia, which has been steadily orienting itself to Finland and the EU.
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Not only were Pskov regional elites closed to the West, but the West also showed little willingness to engage the Pskov regime. As one study described the sorry state of Pskov's external relations: "Until the end of the 1990s, the [o]blast was a blank spot on the map of projects funded by the EU TACIS Programme or by other international donors." 90 The isolated local NGOs that did apply for EU aid were unsuccessful because "back then Pskov was not the main concern" of the Union. Those who considered applying were discouraged from doing so: "When we went to consult TACIS preliminarily, before applying, they said 'Pskov is not a priority . . . You are welcome to apply of course, but it is unlikely that your application will be considered favorably,'" recalls the head of a local NGO. 91 The situation changed substantially around the time the Baltic states acceded to the European Union in 2004; Pskov became the EU's eastern border region. This new status ensured a sustained level of engagement on the part of European actors despite the continued closeness of the regime. TACIS staff on the ground maintained that it took a significant amount of shaking up of the regional officials by the EU in the form of awareness-increasing seminars and meetings aimed at encouraging the oblast to open up to external cooperation. It was not too long before Pskov's leaders perceived the benefits of the newly proposed partnership with Europe. Similar to other EU border regions, it was given a voice in the selection of Western partners and proposals related to cross-border cooperation as an incentive to project involvement. The financial and economic benefits of neighbor-friendliness were not lost on Pskov's leaders, as indeed they were not lost on the leadership of the EU's new Baltic members. One Pskov official illustrated the importance of EU funding in encouraging cross-border cooperation: "The Balts now feel that they have to work with us. They are about to get 89 Pskov also differed from its other neighbor Novgorod, since the mid-1990s a magnet for investors and donors. money from EU structural funds. We say to them, 'We are very happy for you, but the situation has to change so that not only you will get all the money.'" 92 In 2004 Pskov was already engaged in several EU-supported projects with Estonia and in negotiating future neighborhood programs. The development of a Pskov-Livonia Euroregion aimed at promoting cooperation between authorities in Pskov and the Baltic countries was also under way and hailed as a "model for good neighbor relations with the EU." 93 Moreover, while in the past project cooperation in Pskov occurred largely at the regional administration level, TACIS staff point out that it now also occurs at the lower municipal levels of authority. Likewise, regional officials previously suspicious of local NGOs that engaged in unsanctioned foreign cooperation projects now perceive that "if local organizations, including independent ones, do not participate, Pskov will fall out [of the process] and will lose financially." 94 The regional authorities even turned to local NGOs for assistance in running Western-funded projects because they themselves lacked such project-implementation training and experience. 95 The change in perceptions is similar to what we observed in Karelia, where regional elites came to regard external funding as an important economic and political resource and thought it in their best interest to internalize the norms and practices of European donors.
The availability and structure of EU funding therefore encouraged greater regional openness and interaction with external actors at the level of administrative elites, organized social groups, and broader society. In this case, Pskov's location on the EU border was key to the EU's decision to shake up the region. The data make clear that no such shake-up has taken place in the closed republics and other regions badly in need of democracy. While high levels of openness encouraged Western presence in other, nonfrontier regions, in Pskov's case location on the EU border ensured the Union's commitment to regional reform even in the initial absence of intraregional openness.
The emergence of the shared border between Pskov and the EU also contributed to greater levels of economic cooperation with its Bal- percent. In the first nine months of 2004 alone, that is, immediately prior to and after accession of the Baltic states to the EU, there was a threefold increase in foreign investment in the oblast as compared with the corresponding period in the previous year.
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Mikhail Kuznetsov, Pskov's current governor, maintains that the economic processes accompanying EU expansion eastward will only serve to further encourage cross-border economic activity and greater contacts among neighbors. "Having entered the European Union, they [the Baltic states] are already suffering the economic impact of accession. Because of the increase in labor costs, many industries are becoming ineffective, and they have to be moved somewhere. . . . If they move them here, it will be good both for us and for them. They will save. And we will have created new jobs." Pskov, at one time a closed fortress region and buffer against external invaders, also has a history of being ruled by Novgorod, the region known as the "cradle of Russian democracy" and that was involved in Hanseatic trade. In the case of Karelia, its Finnish legacy may have influenced the adaptability of its elite and the broader public to democratic norms, while its place in Finnish national mythology is an important factor in that country's interest in getting involved in aid projects in Karelia.
The impact of these longer-term historical legacies on current patterns of regional democratization only serves to confirm our argument over a much more extended time frame. This is because the legacies inferred to explain greater levels of democracy, as is the case with Novgorod's involvement in Hanseatic trade or with Karelia's ties to Finland, are often linked to exposure to West European civilization. Geography and the patterns of social, economic, and political interaction that it conditions depending on the wider political context at a given point in time, matter, whether looking at longer-term historical legacies or current developments. As Kopstein and Reilly rightly discern, while "path dependence of political and economic reforms may explain the process of change . . . location determines the path." 100 
CONCLUSION
The geographic incremental processes of democratization in Russia's frontier regions and regional patterns of EU aid suggest that subnational geography should be considered an important factor in the analysis of postcommunist democratic change. Geographic proximity to the West facilitates the diffusion of Western influences in Russia's localities and increases their openness. Proximity also encourages neighboring Western actors to pursue targeted democratization efforts.
The frontier regions are not the only objects of targeted EU aid, however. In fact, territorially more remote nonfrontier regions extending as far as western Siberia are also likely to be beneficiaries of aid if they are open to external influences. These findings are consistent with the EU's declared objective of rewarding good achievers and show that not only states with membership prospects in the Union are subject to sustained aid efforts. 101 Significantly, few of the highest democratic achievers are located very far east or south, a pattern that confirms that diffusion processes leading to greater openness and democracy are influenced by a region's geographic location. The EU is also prepared to go only so far east and south in its targeted aid activity. For better or worse, the regions on Russia's southern and eastern frontiers are likely to be influenced by other external players.
A detailed discussion of those influences is beyond the scope of this study. We briefly note here the lack of established democracies bordering on Russia's southern regions. China, an economic megaplayer in far eastern Russia, is not a democracy. Japan, an important neighboring democracy, maintains a largely economic involvement in the Far East that is distinct from the normative power concerns of the EU in Russia's regions. Although Japan is among the leading foreign-aid donors, scholars have also discerned the business-driven nature of its aid policies.
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The regional dimension of the aid activity of other major nonneighbor donors is likewise beyond the scope of this study. U.S. democracy promoters in Russia's regions tend to support local actors that are relatively more developed institutionally and perceived to be more Western in terms of their business practices, language skills, and issue orientation. The U.S. and Canada also include a northern gradient in their Russian aid policies and thus partly overlap with EU policies.
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Such targeted and sustained efforts by Western actors who chose to partner with more open and more geographically, culturally, and institutionally Western regions, will only serve to reinforce the already existing spatial disparities in levels of democracy. In regions bordering a powerful democratic player, the powerful neighbor may over time decisively influence the region's democratization trajectory. The causal processes discussed in this article are therefore not unidirectional and the argument should not be interpreted as a suggestion that Western aid is the decisive factor influencing regional democracy levels across all regions. What we observe are clusters of interaction between regional openness, democracy, and targeted EU aid that are related to a region's geographic location.
Finally, we acknowledge that the focus on regional and external actors need not obscure the importance of the federal government as a 102 trendsetter for the nationwide democracy trajectory. Nevertheless, the continued Russian regional engagement with the West militates against whole-nation bias in our analysis of political change. President Putin might see external donors as agents plotting another color revolution while the mayors of Pskov or Petrozavodsk might see them as partners genuinely interested in addressing problems of concern to their common neighborhood. Likewise, NGO mobilization against some of the more draconian efforts to control Western funding illustrates the limited financial reach of the federal government. The national authorities are not eager to substitute for external resources crucial to the survival of many a local NGO and the vital activities carried out by them. 104 The governor of a border region might be a Kremlin appointee while his interlocutors in regional developmental or investment projects are more likely to be neighborhood actors than colleagues from the Kremlin. Finally, security rhetoric notwithstanding, Moscow has been rather reluctant to fund Russia-EU border security checkpoints, leaving this business to regional governments and their Western neighbors.
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Russia may be a torn nation as Samuel Huntington suggests, but not just in the sense of its different national leaders wanting to shift the civilizational belonging and identity of its people, but also in geographic terms and spatial value patterns.
106 A geographic incremental process of Einbindung 107 is evidently taking place-tying westward-and outwardlooking localities into a web of interactions and, perhaps eventually, into greater integration with Western neighbors. These geographically conditioned processes should help to explain and to predict change throughout the postcommunist world and in other settings.
APPENDIX 1 PROCEDURES FOR CALCULATING THE OPENNESS SCORE
In order to create an aggregate score for each of the different openness scores (oscore), we first ranked all the values for each subindicator. We then sorted them in ascending order and arranged them into ten groups with each group assigned a score from the smallest value of 1 to the highest of 10. This procedure ensures that the assigned scores are evenly distributed. The total score is the sum of all subindicators that comprise each of the respective oscores. The total score range from 1 to 10 is in accordance with the ascending values for each subindicator. Therefore, the composite openness score oscore95-03 includes three subindidators and ranges from 3 to 30; and the openness scores oscore98-02 and oscore99-03 include five subindicators and range from 5 to 50. The oscore99-02 includes six subindicators and ranges from 6 to 60.
The 
APPENDIX 2 RELIABILITY TEST FOR OPENNESS SCORES
In order to test for the reliability of the openness scores, including oscore95-03, oscore98-02, oscore99-02, and oscore99-03, we conducted a Cronbach's Alpha test. The test shows the correlation between each subindicator and total score. Since all of the subscores for each subindicator are measured on the same scale of 1 to 10, we used the unstandardized items for the test. For the openness score oscore95-03, the scale reliability coefficient is 0.6761, which is slightly below the satisfactory alpha value of 0.7 and indicates a somewhat low correlation. The most reliable openness score is oscore99-02, which includes all the six subindicators, with the highest alpha value of 0.7877. However, due to limited data availability and intention to reflect the time trend by lagging the openness variable, only oscore95-03 can attain the greater data points objective. Considering high correlation between all the openness scores, as presented in the correlation matrix in Appendix 5, we conclude that it is reliable to use the oscore95-03 as the measure of openness. The results of the tests are presented in Tables 7-10. .000
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